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The Cardinal Virtues of the Bodhisattva 
in Dogen’s Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki
DOUGLAS K. MIKKELSON
STUDENTS of Dogen it/c (1200-1253) typically cut their teeth on theShdbdgenzd Zuimonki Without a doubt, this text is “read­
ily accessible” Dogen in many respects, and a useful primer to successive 
forays into more complex texts such as the monumental Shdbdgenzd JEfeUS 
jjg. In recent decades, a fair amount of scholarship has been devoted to the 
interpretation of Dogen’s moral vision. Typically, presentations of this vi­
sion have drawn from various Dogen texts in order to support a particular 
line of interpretation, and the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki makes its contributions 
to a greater or lesser extent. Consequently, we now have some sophisticated 
interpretations of the overall trajectory of Dogen’s moral thought, and these 
can be applied specifically to the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki itself.
We can begin with the observation that for Dogen there is an inexorable 
link between morality and enlightenment, and an identity between enlight­
enment and zazen Ultimately speaking, morality proceeds from the 
enlightenment which is manifest in every moment of zazen. Thus zazen and 
moral capacity proceed hand-in-hand. Even in the first moment of practicing 
zazen, enlightenment is actualized, and correspondingly there is an advance 
in the practitioner’s moral development. Subsequent moral growth is contin­
gent upon continued actualization of enlightenment, and the primary locus 
for this actualization is the practice of zazen.
Of course, from this moral dynamic we readily infer that the novice prac­
titioner of zazen is, comparatively speaking, on a lower level of moral attain­
ment than the advanced practitioner. On a practical level, the novice
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practitioner is in need of an ethical road map, an indicator of where he/she is, 
the terrain being traversed, and where he/she is heading. Dogen provides it, 
and the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki is particulary useful inasmuch as a great deal 
of the text is devoted to relative newcomers on the journey.
To a large degree, the map the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki provides is com­
posed of the Buddhist precepts. Time and again Dogen mentions the pre­
cepts, exhorting the need to receive them, follow them, and return to them 
when one has gone morally astray. Indeed, his vision of moral goodness is 
largely clear from looking at the precepts he cites.
Yet Dogen’s morality is ultimately not a rule-based ethics. True, for the 
new student of Buddhism, the precepts provide clear guidelines of right and 
wrong, and he/she is exhorted to follow them. But in the course of zazen/ 
enlightenment, the precepts are less and less prescriptions for the practition­
er and more and more descriptions of his/her actual moral becoming. From 
an ultimate standpoint, the Buddhist precepts do not tell us how to be moral, 
but explain to us what we look like when we are moral. Also, from an ulti­
mate standpoint, the fulfillment of the Buddhist precepts is not a condition of 
zazew/enlightenment, but a natural function of zazew/enlightenment. As 
Dogen states, “When doing zazen, what precepts are not upheld, what mer­
its not produced?” (Z 1.2).1
1 Masunaga 1978, p. 3. I am indebted to this work for the translated passages of the 
Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki which appear in this article. In order to avoid a cumbersome prolifera­
tion of footnotes, I have decided to include all citations of the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki in the text 
of the article itself. I have adopted the citation method employed by Masunaga. Thus Z 1.2 
refers to chapter one, section two of the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki.
2 MacIntyre 1984, pp. 168-69.
But Dogen’s picture of moral goodness in the Shobogenzo Zuimonki is not 
limited to invoking the precepts. Other markers appear which serve to give 
us a fuller picture. Among these are what Dogen has to say about “virtues.”
Regarding virtue-thinking, Alasdair MacIntyre identifies one philosophi­
cal avenue as “a simple monism of virtue.” In this conception, “[virtue] is 
essentially a singular expression and its possession by an individual an all or 
nothing matter.” To put it simply, either one has what we call virtue, or one 
does not; there are no intermediate degrees.2 Taken individually, certain 
points in the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki seem congruent with this conception; for 
example, in the course of a discussion on the essentials of Zen teaching and 
practice, Dogen asserts: “When you look at a person, he should be seen from 
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the standpoint of his true virtue (Jittoku Jt®). Don’t judge by his outward 
appearance or his supposed virtue (ketoku IS®)” (Z 7.11).
Yet the few places where Dogen speaks of virtue as a singular matter must 
be placed in the overall presentation of the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki, where the 
talk is predominantly plural. The best contextual link is found in 2.10, which 
begins as follows: “You do not deserve the respect of others unless you have 
true virtue within yourself. Because the people of Japan respect others for 
their outward appearance without lenowing the true inner virtues, students 
with the mind that seeks the Way fall into evil paths and become the follow­
ers of demons.” In the history of the English language, a “virtue” has some­
times designated an internal moral quality and at other times an outward 
manifestation of moral excellence,3 and both meanings are interdependently 
present in Dogen’s usage. “Virtue practiced inwardly manifests itself on the 
outside,” we read in 2.3. For Dogen, this pertains not only to moral goodness 
in the general sense, but also to the fact that a particular virtue “practiced 
inwardly manifests itself on the outside.” Thus Dogen can be said to regard 
a particular “virtue” as designating both an internal, good disposition to be 
cultivated and the outward expression of this disposition at the same time. In 
order to retain the sense of this dynamic relationship between the inner and 
outer development of a particular virtue, I will at times speak of the cultiva­
tion/expression of that virtue.
3 See The Oxford English Dictionary, 1984 ed., s.v. “Virtue.”
Speaking of compassion and wisdom, Dogen comments:
In Buddhism there are some who are endowed with compassion 
and wisdom from the outset. Yet even though these qualities may 
not be present from the beginning, they can be acquired by study. 
Don’t cling arbitrarily to your own views. Just cast aside both body 
and mind, plunge into the great sea of Buddhism and entrust your­
self to the Buddhist teachings (Z 5.1).
Virtues are authentic expressions of moral goodness, and if we seek to know 
what specific virtues form the presentation of the good person in the Shdbdgenzd 
Zuimonki, we can begin with compassion and wisdom. Furthermore, in line 
with Mahayana tradition, Dogen asserts the ultimate nonduality of kariinci 
and prajha. Accordingly, henceforward I will refer to the virtue of compas­
sion-wisdom in my analysis.
So how do we acquire the virtues? Note how 5.1 above begins its 
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explanations with the admonition to “cast aside body and mind.” To cast 
aside body and mind is to actualize enlightenment. As noted in the introduc­
tion to this article, for Dogen the primary locus for the realization of enlight­
enment is zazen. From this we can readily see that in Dogen’s moral 
thinking, self-cultivation of the virtues begins with zazen.
This relationship between zazen and the virtues is found in Shdbdgenzd 
Zuimonki 1.4. Dogen informs his listeners that, in order to be priests, one 
must be properly trained and must:
cast aside attachments to the Self and conform to the teachings of 
the Zen Masters. The essential requisite is to abandon avarice. To 
do this, you must first free yourself from egoism. . . . Most people 
m the world like to regard themselves as good and to have others 
think the same of them, but such a thing seldom happens. If, how­
ever, you gradually forsake attachment to the Self and follow the 
advice of your teacher, you will progress.
For a Zen monk the primary prerequisite for improvement is the 
practice of concentrated zazen. Without arguing who is clever and 
who is inept, who is wise and who is foolish, just do zazen. You 
will then naturally improve.
There is much one can say about this passage, but for our purposes it helps to 
begin with the assertion that “the essential requisite is to abandon avarice.” 
Avarice is readily recognizable as one of those bad dispositions we label 
“vices.” Dogen’s exhortation to abandon it is the functional equivalent of 
calling us to take up its opposing virtue; one must free oneself from egoism 
to realize this. But the primary prerequisite for realizing moral goodness as a 
whole and the requisite obtainment of the virtue opposing avarice is the prac­
tice of zazen. This improvement, furthermore, proceeds “naturally.” The 
virtue in question, therefore, proceeds naturally from—or alternately ex­
pressed, is a function of—zazen.
Thus we begin to see a substantively more complete picture of moral 
goodness as presented by the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki. Generally speaking, 
moral goodness is a function of zazenlenlightenment. What moral goodness 
specifically looks like is delineated not only by reference to precepts, as dis­
cussed earlier, but also by reference to virtues. Furthermore, as with the ful­
fillment of the precepts, on a lower level virtues are things we are prescribed 
to obtain; “they can be acquired by study,” as we saw in 5.1 above in rela­
tion to compassion and wisdom. But ultimately, as we can construct from a
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reading of 1.4 and 5.1, the cultivation/expression of the virtues, like the ful­
fillment of the precepts, is a function of zazen/enlightenment.
That “abandoning avarice,” mentioned in 1.4 above, is in effect an 
instruction to cultivate the opposing virtue, becomes evident when under­
stood in the broader context of Dogen’s moral thinking. This requires us to 
return to the larger Shobogenzo where, in the Bodaisatta Shishobo 
chapter, Dogen expounds on: 1) fuse 2) rzzgo 3) rigyo 
and 4) z/o/z In]*.4 Along with noting the presence of compassion-wisdom, 
mapping these bodaisatta shishobo provides us with a good picture of the 
virtue-thinking in the Shobogenzo Zuimonki.
4 The original source for translations of the Shobogenzo in this article is Okubo 1969-70. 
For sake of accessibility, I have tried as much as possible to conform my translation of a given 
passage to those found in one or more of the books in the list of references. I am indebted to 
these authors for the translations appearing in this article; at the same time, I must take respon­
sibility for any shortcomings of the passages as presented in English. As with the Shdbdgenzd 
Zuimonki, I have included citations of the Shobogenzo into the text itself. Thus BS 1, for 
example, refers to the first section of the Bodaisatta Shishdbo chapter of the Shdbdgenzd.
Yet, if we can speak broadly of something called “Dogen’s moral think­
ing,” we must also recognize that his ideas developed over time. Increas­
ingly, historians have mapped the relationship between Dogen’s early views 
and his later ones. What emerges are vectors of thought that, at times, show 
a remarkable continuity between early and later “Dogens” and at others, 
show radical differences.
I think there is a significant vector of intellectual continuity linking the 
Bodaisatta Shishobo chapter of the Shobogenzo with the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki. 
The most direct evidence for this link can be stated as follows: If we read the 
Shobogenzo Zuimonki in light of the Bodaisatta Shishobo, substantial por­
tions of the former text present themselves to us with greater clarity. Further­
more, this interpretive strategy illuminates how Dogen resolved certain 
moral dilemmas—resolutions which prima facie may appear to the reader as 
either obscure or arbitrary.
Before we can pursue this thesis, some consideration of the historical con­
texts of these two texts is helpful. This will enable us to incorporate some 
historically-textured analysis at certain points. It will also provide back­
ground for seeing the link between the bodaisatta shishobo in the Shdbdgenzd 
and Dogen’s discussion of toku in the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki.
The Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki is a collection of Dogen’s conversations with 
various individuals recorded by his disciple, Koun Ejo (1198- 
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1280). Scholars debate the precise time span of this recording—1234 being 
the earliest beginning date and 1237 the latest ending date. Precision on this 
matter is relevant because in October of 1236 Dogen formally opened 
Koshbji WMf A, the first Chinese-style Zen monastery in Japan, at Fukakusa, 
outside of Kyoto—the same location where Dogen had already formed a 
community of followers.5 How much of Dogen’s teachings in the text reflect 
the time just prior to the founding of Koshoji, when Dogen would presum­
ably have been preoccupied to a considerable degree with the details of real­
izing the physical creation of his cherished temple and mentally preparing 
his monks for their new life there? How much of the Shobogenzo Zuimonki 
reflects the time just after the founding of the temple, when people from all 
walks of life traveled to marvel at the monks meditating in their new hall 
and, at the same time, receive Dogen’s instruction? Among other things, bet­
ter answers to these questions would help us to understand the context of 
Dogen’s teachings, especially to whom they were directed.
5 According to Ito Shuken’s study on the chronological order of Dogen’s collected writ­
ings, the Shobogenzd Zuimonki was recorded by Ejo between 1234 and 1236, during his novi­
tiate period (see Ito 1998, pp. 223-23, 396-99). Masunaga Reiho notes that the colophon of 
the popular edition of the Tokugawa period lists the years as 1235-37, and according to 
Shobogenzd Zuimonki 5.5, Dogen invited Ejo to take the position of meditation director on 
January 28, 1327. Ejo’s status is relevant, since 1) Ejo appears as a recipient of Dogen’s 
instruction in the text, and 2) while the recorded teachings belong to Dogen, what has been 
recorded reflects Ejo’s own interests.
That Dogen’s teachings were sometimes directed towards monks and 
sometimes towards laypersons, accounts for much of the seeming inconsis­
tencies one finds in the Shobogenzo Zuimonki. In line with the Buddhist con­
cept of updya, Dogen tailored his teaching according to the position and the 
capacity of the listener. What Dogen had to say to his monks is of particular 
interest to us here, as it established one of the connections this text has to 
the Bodaisatta Shishobo chapter of the Shobogenzo, to which we shall now 
turn.
The Shobogenzo is a collection of independent texts composed over a span 
of two decades; once again, the collector was Ejo. About two-thirds of the 
work dates roughly from 1240 to 1244. Among the texts Dogen produced in 
this flurry of writing was the Bodaisatta Shishobo, dated May 5, 1243. Thus 
its composition is about six or seven years after that of the Shobogenzd 
Zuimonki.
The date offered for the composition of the Bodaisatta Shishobo is of
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interest because of its proximity to Dogen’s relocation of his monastic com­
munity to Echizen in July of the same year. Exactly why Dogen made this 
move has been a subject of considerable debate. According to one proposed 
scenario, the Bodaisatta Shishobd was produced just after the destruction of 
Koshoji by Tendai monks envious of the vitality and influence of the temple. 
A collection of Tendai texts, dating from the fourteenth century, includes the 
comment that Dogen was forced out of Fukakusa by persecution.6 Political 
and religious persecution may well have been a factor in Dogen’s relocation, 
though historians in this camp disagree on the details. Some scholars argue 
that corroborating evidence of an actual physical attack on Koshoji cannot be 
found, and in any case is nowhere reflected in Dogen’s writings.7 Yet hostil­
ity towards exclusive approaches to Zen in this era has been identified, as can 
be seen in the history of Tofukuji a powerful Tendai temple which
6 Bodiford 1993, p. 28.
7 For a detailed presentation of this point of view, see Bodiford 1993, pp. 27-30.
incorporated Zen meditation but expressly denounced independent Zen sec­
tarianism. Possibly, Dogen simply saw the writing on the wall, so to speak, 
and made a strategic move designed to ensure his own independence.
Whatever the exact historical circumstances of these two texts, it is clear 
that both were produced at a time proximate to a period of profound transi­
tion for Dogen’s community of monks, when he was preparing them for life 
and practice in a new temple. As we shall see, in both instances Dogen pro­
duced instruction manifesting the bodaisatta shishobd, and this was intend­
ed for his monastic community.
Translators of Dogen have rendered the term “bodaisatta shishobo” in a 
variety of ways. For example, Tanahashi Kazuaki renders it as “the bod­
hisattva’s four methods of guidance,” Thomas Cleary prefers “the four inte­
grative methods of the bodhisattva,” while Yokoi Yuho offers us “the four 
ways for a bodhisattva to pursue.” While all of these translations have merit, 
I prefer Hee-Jin Kim’s translation as “the four cardinal virtues of the bod­
hisattva,” largely because it has an explanatory power which is useful to my 
analysis.
We should immediately note that Dogen himself never labels the bodaisatta 
shishobd as “virtues” per se. But if we recall his discussion of virtues in the 
Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki, we can understand why Kim suggests a link between 
the bodaisatta shishobd of the later text with Dogen’s conception of toku in 
the earlier one, and why he interprets them as virtues. First of all, Dogen’s
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bodaisatta shishdbd are derived from Mahayana Buddhist tradition, wherein 
they were originally construed as “virtues” and were part of the “skillfulness 
in choice and means and methods, the seventh perfection” of a bodhisattva.8 
Second, and more importantly, whatever other role they play in Dogen’s 
thinking, the bodaisatta shishdbd are also both internal, good dispositions to 
be cultivated and the outward expressions of these dispositions at the same 
time. As noted in my previous analysis, this is precisely what Dogen under­
stands virtues to be.
8 Dayal 1932, pp. 251-69.
That, on one level, the bodaisatta shishdbd fit the criteria of “virtues” for 
Dogen can be seen in a careful reading of his exposition of the four found in 
the Shobdgenzo. As I mentioned earlier, he draws upon the Mahayana 
Buddhist tradition in developing his ideas. However, Dogen was rarely con­
tent with merely passing forward Buddhist teachings; in his appropriation of 
the bodaisatta shishdbd, he transforms them as well.
Perhaps the most radical instance of this is seen when we consider fuse. 
The transformation begins when Dogen defines this term as “nongreed,” 
where “nongreed means not to covet; not to covet means not to curry anoth­
er’s favor.” Fuse is typically translated as “giving,” and certainly giving is a 
component of this virtue. This giving is meant in both a material and spiritu­
al sense: “It is to give away unneeded belongings to someone you don’t 
know, to offer flowers blooming on a distant mountain to the Tathagata, or, 
again, to offer treasures you had in your former life to sentient beings” (BS 
1.4).
However, according to Dogen, fuse means nongreed, and by this he cer­
tainly has in mind our conventional understanding of avarice, i.e., an exces­
sive hoarding of material goods. He also has in mind spiritual avarice, as 
evidenced in the passage quoted above. The sentence “nongreed means not 
to covet” partly reveals that Dogen is not only thinking of avarice in the nar­
row sense, but the kind of craving desire mentioned in the tenth command­
ment of the Decalogue (Exod. 20:17) and, even more broadly, in the Second 
Noble Truth.
Fuse, then, partially corresponds to what the first virtue means in its orig­
inal Mahayana sense. But in defining the term, Dogen transforms it. In a bold 
stroke, he indicates that “giving” and “not coveting” are nondual. By this 
Dogen is partly pointing to how the noncovetous person, who subsequently 
owns little beyond what he/she needs, frees up resources for giving to others.
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We see an example of this in 1.16 of the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki, where Dogen 
is quoted as follows:
The Buddha has said, “Possess nothing except your robes and 
bowl and give to starving people the leftovers from what you have 
begged.” If not a scrap is to be saved from what you receive, how 
much more should one avoid rushing about searching for things.
Yet Dogen is also pointing to how the absence of covetousness, in its broad­
er sense, is none other than giving as well: “To leave flowers to the wind, to 
leave birds to the seasons, are also acts of giving” (BS 1).
“Not to covet means not to curry favor” might initially sound as if Dogen 
is deliberately courting obfuscation, but it makes sense if you follow how he 
has been constructing/wse. As a consequence of the nonduality between giv­
ing and noncovetousness, giving is to be performed without the intent of 
“coveting” a reward from someone or in some manner. Dogen gives an ex­
ample of noncovetous giving: “A king gave his beard as medicine to cure his 
retainer’s disease; a child offered sand to Buddha and became King Asoka in 
a later birth. They were not greedy for reward but only shared what they 
could” (BS 1).
Dogen’s understanding of fuse entails not only an external act of giving, 
but also an exhortation to develop an internal disposition, as we can see in 
the language of the definition itself (“nongreed”, “not to covet”). Immedi­
ately following the definition, the nature of fuse as an internal disposition 
unfolds further, as we learn that proper giving is a function of our inward 
mental state: “Even if one should rule four continents, to provide education 
and civilization in the correct way is just a matter of not being covetous.” 
That cultivation of fuse as an inward mental disposition is a component of, 
and indeed at the heart of, Dogen’s meaning, becomes evident when we take 
in his description of fuse as a whole. We can see this by juxtaposing three 
subsequent passages. Just after his statement about material and spiritual 
giving quoted above, he adds: “The size of the offering is of no concern; it is 
the sincerity with which it is given that is important.” To this declaration of 
the “mind” one brings to giving, we are told later that “Not only should you 
make an effort to give, but also be mindful of every opportunity to give.” 
Finally, in wrapping up his treatment of this topic, Dogen tells us that the 
very act of giving itself cultivates the inner capacity to exercise fuse'. “More­
over, in giving, mind transforms the gift and the giving transforms the mind” 
(BS 1).
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Fuse, we can readily see, is both an internal moral quality and an outward 
manifestation of a moral excellence which can be cultivated—which is pre­
cisely how the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki describes a virtue. For Dogen, then,/wse 
is a virtue that encompasses “giving” and “noncovetousness” at the same 
time. Granted, at times, he talks about the one without explicitly mentioning 
the other. Ultimately, however, one arises interdependently with the other. 
For that reason, I shall render the virtue of fuse as “giving-noncovetous- 
ness.” The hyphen serves to convey the aforementioned interdependency. 
Virtues, furthermore, are typically expressed in a noun form, grammatically 
speaking, and this will harmonize fuse with other virtues expressed in the 
text. Finally, such a rendering retains the sense in which fuse is not only an 
outward act but an inner disposition.
If we play close attention to Dogen’s analysis of the remaining three 
shishobo, vjq notice they also meet his criteria for virtues. Note the interde­
pendent relationship between inner disposition and outward behavior in the 
definition of the second shishobo, aigo. “Aigo means that in looking upon 
living beings one should first arouse a mind of kindness and love and should 
utter caring, kind words” (BS 2, emphasis mine). “Arouse a mind of kind­
ness” points us to the cultivation of aigo, which like fuse is partly accom­
plished by its own practice: “Once one has taken to aigo, one will gradualy 
increase aigo.” Aigo receives extended treatment in 1.7 of the Shdbdgenzd 
Zuimonki, which begins: “Monks must not be scolded and castigated with 
harsh words; nor should they be held up to scorn by having their faults point­
ed out.” As a virtue, aigo can more broadly be linked with the notion of right 
speech advocated in the Eightfold Noble Path, which is reflected in a comm- 
ment by Dogen in 5.4: “The essence of Confucianism is to check the bad and 
encourage the good by the skillful use of words. Zen monks, when guiding 
others, must also adopt skillfulness such as this.”
Compared to fuse, aigo is straightforward and, one might say, convention­
ally Buddhist. It is typically translated as “kind speech.” For the same 
reasons that I have rendered fuse by the dispositional term “giving-noncov- 
etousness,” however, I have chosen to identify aigo as the virtue of “verbal 
kindness.” Reference in the definition and elsewhere in section 2 of the 
Bodaisatta Shishobo to arousing the mind of aigo is one reason we would do 
well to adopt this form.
Rigyo, the third virtue, is the most visible of the cardinal virtues of the 
bodhisattva in the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki. As with aigo, Dogen’s introduc­
tion of the term in the Bodaisatta Shishobo displays the interdependence of 
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inner disposition and outer action: “Rigyo means to devise ways of benefit­
ing others, be they high or low. Those who aided the helpless tortoise or the 
injured sparrow did not expect any reward for their assistance; they simply 
acted out of the feeling of rigyo” (BS 3). Dogen exhorts the cultivation of 
rigyo, noting that “once we have this benevolent mind, it will arise unremit­
tingly even for grass, trees, wind and water.” Among the numerous refer­
ences to benefiting others in the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki is this passage from 
1.20: “Whatever events occur, consider things solely in terms of how to 
make Buddhism flourish and how to bring benefit to all beings.” The con­
nection between Buddhist practice and benefiting others receives further 
treatment in the text, as we shall see.
Rigyo has been rendered ably in English as “beneficial action” by some 
translators.9 In keeping with understanding each of these shishobo as at once 
an inward disposition and its outward expression, I have opted for Yokoi’s 
translation of the term as “benevolence.” As with “virtue,” the history of 
this word in the English language makes it well suited for designating some­
thing that is, simultaneously, both an inward moral quality and an outward 
action.10
9 See Tanahashi 1985, p. 46, and Cleary 1986, p. 119.
10 See The Oxford English Dictionary, 1984 ed., s.v. “Benevolence.”
Finally, doji “means nondifference. This applies equally to the self and 
others” (BS 4; all quotes in the next two paragraphs are from this source). 
The interdependency of inward disposition and outward behavior is evident 
in Dogen’s attempt to further refine the term: “The ji of doji means right 
form, dignity, correct manner.” “Dignity” points us to an internal disposi­
tion, “correct manner” towards outward behavior, and “right form” to both. 
It is evident that the performance of doji towards others cultivates doji for 
ourselves, because “when we know doji, others and self are one.”
Realization of the nonduality of self and others inwardly as a disposition, 
and outwardly as an action, encapsulates the fourth virtue of doji. That non­
difference applies equally to self and others has radical implications for the 
cultivation/expression of this virtue. “Others” are to be regarded nondis- 
criminately, just as the wise emperor “allots his praise and blame impartial­
ly”; “self” is to be regarded nondiscriminately, just as “the ocean does not 
exclude the ocean.” In other words, in the cultivation/expression of doji, all 
others are treated equally and the self is treated equally with all others. 
Ultimately, self and others are treated equally because “you cause yourself to 
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be in identity with yourself,” i.e., there is a fundamental nondifference 
between self and others.
Prima facie, we might regard this virtue as of little help when faced with 
the moral dilemma requiring a choice involving others, self, and self with 
others. But “the relationship of self and others varies limitlessly with cir­
cumstances,” according to Dogen. How doji figures in Dogen’s moral deci­
sion-making in particular circumstances will be addressed below.
Of different translations offered for doji, I prefer “identification,”11 since 
this word captures both the inward disposition and the outer action. Futher- 
more, it can serve to call to mind how doji is a virtue which cultivates/ 
expresses: 1) nondiscriminating actions towards others, 2) nondiscrimina­
tion towards oneself, and 3) the ultimate identification of self and others.
11 See Yokoi 1986, p. 849.
As the above analysis reveals, fuse, aigo, rigyo and doji as described by 
Dogen in the Shdbdgenzd, meet the criteria for “virtues” as delineated in the 
Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki inasmuch as each one is an internal moral quality and 
an outward manifestation of a moral excellence which can be cultivated. 
Thus Kim’s rendering of bodaisatta shishdbd as “the four cardinal virtues of 
the bodhisattva” is an insightful interpretive strategy. As we shall see, under­
standing the bodaisatta shishdbd as cardinal virtues enables us to better chart 
the moral territory of the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki.
The final sentence of the Bodaisatta Shishdbd informs us: “The shishdbd 
encompass as many again respectively, so there are sixteen in all.” The 
conclusion of the chapter is an application of the Madhyamika teaching on 
pratitya-samutpada, or “interdependent arising,” to the four virtues of the 
bodhisattva. The doctrine of interdependent arising asserts that all psycho­
logical and physical phenomena constituting individual existence are inter­
dependent and mutually condition each other. Drawing on the Madhyamika 
formulation of this doctrine as “the interdependence of all things,” Dogen 
applies it to fuse, aigo, rigyo, and doji, emphasizing how they are interde­
pendent and mutually condition each other.
The bodaisatta shishdbd are important to Dogen’s presentation of moral 
goodness in the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki, as is evident by the many references 
to them we see in the text, some examples of which we have already noted. 
What we notice in the Shdbdgenzd is, in part, a refinement of Dogen’s think­
ing on these bodaisatta shishdbd which were manifested earlier in the 
Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki. But if this “refinement” expresses the continuity of 
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his earlier and later teaching on the bodaisatta shishobo, nonetheless it also 
indicates at least some degree of development, and therefore we may specu­
late as to why the Bodaisatta Shishobo chapter looks the way it does.
External factors may have played a role here. As noted above, both texts 
were produced at a time proximate to a transition point amongst Dogen’s 
monastic community. But the Shobogenzo Zuimonki was composed around 
the time the community moved into Koshoji; the Bodaisatta Shishobo 
around the time they abandoned it. If Dogen was indeed forced to abandon 
Koshoji because of religious and political persecution, this may help explain 
his radical opening words to the latter text: “Fuse means nongreed; nongreed 
means not to covet; not to covet means not to curry another’s favor.” Perhaps 
Dogen was making an oblique reference to this historical situation: the 
monks, and indeed he himself, had to refrain from greed during this transi­
tional period. They should not be greedily covetous of the glorious Koshoji 
temple that they had been forced to abandon; nor should they try to curry 
favor in seeking patronage for the new Daibutsuji (later renamed
Eiheiji temple.
We do know that Dogen’s disciples complained of the poor living condi­
tions in rural Echizen, which must have contrasted greatly with what they 
were accustomed to at Koshoji, and Dogen may well have anticipated this 
situation and sought to mentally toughen up his monks beforehand. This 
might be why we see numerous exhortations, both direct and implied, to 
pursue poverty in the Shobogenzd Zuimonki as well as in the Bodaisatta 
Shishobo. “Give your valuables, even a penny or a blade of grass; it will be 
a wholesome root for this and other lifetimes,” reads the latter text, and of 
course a penny or a blade of grass is only valuable to someone whose 
achievement of poverty is nearly complete.
Moreover, historical circumstances may have had something to do with 
why, out of a myriad of possible Buddhist topics, Dogen chose to produce 
the Bodaisatta Shishdbo chapter in the first place. If destruction, or at least 
persecution, of Koshoji did indeed compel Dogen and his monks to abandon 
it, maybe he saw in the bodaisatta shishobo an interpretive vehicle that could 
help to reconcile himself and his monks to the new situation. Following this 
line of interpretation, he could be seen as exhorting a nonattachment, more 
specifically a giving-noncovetousness, towards Koshoji, and preaching the 
virtues of verbal kindness, benevolence, and identification even towards 
those who persecuted them in their beloved temple. This might also explain
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the subsequent chapters of the Shdbdgenzd produced in Echizen, wherein we 
do not find any subsequent reference to the persecution or any expression of 
anger, hatred, regret, and so forth, regarding this subject.12
12 I am indebted to Professor Aramaki Noritoshi of Otani University for directing me 
towards this interpretation. I must immediately add that this acknowledgement does not imply 
that Professor Aramaki would necessarily endorse my particular line of argument, and there­
fore I must take full responsibility for any flaws therein.
13 For more discussion of this possibility, see LaFleur 1985.
Internal factors may also have been behind Dogen’s choice of topic. If we 
recall that he is, among other things, the author of the Shdbdgenzd, then we 
can imagine that he may have been quite aware of his unfolding oeuvre. We 
would then not be surprised to learn that Dogen might have self-consciously 
attempted in the Shdbdgenzd, with varying degrees of success, to create a 
semblance of unity and consistency of structure which incorporated his ear­
lier thinking. To the extent that this project was successful, we would find in 
certain places vectors of intellectual continuity between Dogen’s earlier 
works and his magnum opus.13
It appears that such a vector does exist between the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki 
and the Bodaisatta Shishobd. As I stated above, the most direct evidence for 
this intellectual continuity lies in the explanatory power we achieve when we 
read the former text in light of the latter. We are now in a position to pursue 
the point.
We can begin by recalling that in his final statement of the Bodaisatta 
Shishobd, Dogen applies the concept of pratitya-samutpada to fuse, aigo, 
rigyo, and doji. True, at certain points in the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki, these 
appear briefly and individually. Yet, in most instances, one can recognize 
either explicitly or implicitly an expression of a given virtue’s interdepen­
dency with one or two or three of the others. We see an example of this 
regarding the virtue of identification in a short passage taken from 3.3: “In 
considering people, do not differentiate between the intimate and the distant. 
Resolve to help all equally. Determine in your mind to benefit others, 
whether lay or clerical, without self-interest or profit, and without caring 
whether people know or appreciate your actions.” Following upon the in­
struction to act in accord with the virtue of identification (“do not differenti­
ate between the intimate and the distant”), Dogen proceeds to qualify this in 
a manner consistent with the virtue of benevolence (“determine in your mind 
to benefit others”) and giving-noncovetousness (“without self-interest or 
profit”).
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The significance of the interdependency and mutual conditioning of each 
virtue of the bodaisatta shishdbd is evident when we consider potential alter­
natives. Confucius, for example, believed that one should practice benevo­
lence, but (unlike his rival, Mo Tzu) did not think it should be exercised 
towards everyone equally, it had to be qualified in terms of the five great 
relations.14 Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), a contemporary of Dogen, at times 
spoke of, for example, a kind of “identity” between parents and children. 
This identity partially dictates how we should extend benevolence to them, 
but following Aristotle he maintained that our helping of others is effected 
by our relative degree of consanguinity to them,15 which is certainly not an 
instance of “[no] differentiation between the intimate and the distant.” The 
interdependency and mutual conditioning of the bodaisatta shishdbd has 
implications for what Dogen has to say about other virtues, as we shall see 
below.
14 The five great relations are: kindness in the father, filial piety in the son; gentility in the 
elder brother, humility and respect in the younger; righteous behavior in the husband, obedi­
ence in the wife; humane consideration in elders, deference in juniors; benevolence in rulers, 
loyalty in ministers and subjects.
15 See Aquinas, Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics 1711.
The interdependent arising of giving-noncovetousness and benevolence 
can be seen at the beginning of Bodaisatta Shishdbd 3.7. That compassion­
wisdom is also mutually interdependent with the bodaisatta shishdbd is 
another aspect of the passage:
Monks should take care to follow the conduct of the Buddha and 
the Patriarchs. Above all, do not covet wealth. It is impossible to 
put into words the depths of the Tathagata’s compassion. Every­
thing he did was for the sake of all sentient beings. There was noth­
ing that he did, no matter how small, that was not done for others.
Some have conceived compassion-wisdom as a virtue of passive sympathet­
ic understanding. But in this passage, its interdependent arising with benev­
olence and giving-noncovetousness displays how active, indeed radically 
active, a virtue it can be. Compassion-wisdom, Dogen tells us, extends to 
even the minute aspects of existence. Later in the section, he expands on his 
comments on giving-noncovetousness: “Masters warn against the accumula­
tion of wealth. When other sects speak well of Zen, the first thing they praise 
is its poverty.”
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But the passage reflects an even more fundamental relationship. In his 
analysis of the bodaisatta shishobo, Kim observes: “Underlying these cardi­
nal virtues is the principle of the non-duality of self and other in the context 
of which alone the selfless activities of the bodhisattva become undefiled, 
free, and natural. The hallmark of great compassion lies in this.”16 In part, 
Kim’s comment helps us to see that what he calls the “cardinal” virtues of 
the bodhisattva are grounded in the “foundational” virtue of compassion­
wisdom. Compassion-wisdom is both interdependent with, and prior to, the 
bodaisatta-shishobo, inasmuch as the latter are part of the “selfless activities 
of the bodhisattva” which flow in a manner natural, free, and undefiled from 
compassion-wisdom.
16 Kim 1975, p. 273.
This fundamental relationship between these cardinal virtues and this 
foundational virtue enables us to trace the cultivation of the bodaisatta 
shishobo back to their ultimate source. For Dogen, compassion-wisdom for 
others is predicated on the ultimate nonduality of self and others. “To love 
others as oneself,” we might say, follows as a matter of course if there is no 
distinction between self and others. But realizing this compassion-wisdom is 
not a mere matter of intellectual assent. Rather, compassion-wisdom must be 
actualized by enlightenment; as discussed above, the primary locus for 
actualizing enlightenment is zazen. From zozen/enlightenment, therefore, 
proceeds compassion-wisdom; compassion-wisdom arises prior to, and 
mutually interdependent with, the bodaisatta shishobo. Ultimately, there­
fore, these cardinal virtues derive from zazen/enlightenment.
The point may seem redundant, as we noted earlier how all the virtues ulti­
mately derive from zazen/enlightenment. But I have gone back to make the 
point specifically about the bodaisatta shishobo so that I can go forward to 
make a new one: These cardinal virtues of which we speak are virtues 
emphasized not for everyone, but for the bodhisattva. The point is perhaps 
obvious, but remains critical not only for understanding how the bodaisatta 
shishobo appear in the Shobogenzo Zuimonki, but the other virtues as well.
Dogen well understood that compassion-wisdom is the sine qua non of 
Buddhist morality. Indeed, compassion-wisdom saturates the entirety of the 
Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki, either explicitly or implicitly. But what he had to say 
depended on to whom he was talking. In these pages we see Dogen employ­
ing Buddhist upaya, wherein the teacher tailors the message according to the 
listener’s ability to understand and capacity to act. Consequently, his teach-
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ings to monks differed from those to laypersons, and many of the seeming 
inconsistencies in the text can be attributed to this. Certainly, lay practition­
ers of Zen are constantly exhorted to practice zazen and become monks: 
“Even in China there were men who renounced hard-to-renounce family ties 
and abandoned hard-to-abandon worldly goods to enter a Zen monastery” (Z 
5.20). But Dogen nonetheless did not fail to answer/address listeners in 
terms appropriate to lay practice, including matters pertaining to compas­
sion-wisdom.
Thus we must resist the temptation to interpret the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki 
as offering one fixed picture of moral goodness. Furthermore, what Dogen 
has to say about compassion-wisdom and the other virtues cannot be reified 
to apply to all people at all times. But in the text we can discern, to some 
extent, how he addressed the matter of the virtues to monks vis-a-vis layper­
sons.
We can begin with the observation that a monk is one who has taken the 
bodhisattva precepts. Zen monks are regarded as bodhisattvas-in-training— 
better yet, they are bodhisattvas unfolding, inasmuch as every moment of 
zazen actualizes the very same enlightenment as the Buddha. Consequently, 
the bodaisatta shishobo pertain particularly to monks. Subsequently, the cul­
tivation and expression of compassion-wisdom are especially interdepen­
dent with these four virtues in the practice of a monk. To the extent that the 
compassion-wisdom of the monk can be described vis-a-vis a layperson, it 
can be partially achieved in relation to the four cardinal virtues of the bod­
hisattva.
We see an example of this in 3.6. Dogen begins his talk by praising the 
T’ang Dynasty emperor, T’ai-tsung (r. 626-49), who decided to forgo 
the building of a new palace during the harvest season because it would 
greatly inconvenience the people, and eventually abandoned the project alto­
gether and remained living in his old, damp, disrepaired one. Dogen com­
ments:
When even a layman feels this way about the people, he has tran­
scended his own body. How much more compassionate should the 
disciples of the Buddha, who follow in the style of the Tathagata, 
be! Their compassion for all the people should be like that towards 
an only son. Don’t scold and make trouble for your attendants 
merely because they serve you. . . . Therefore, students should,
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without showing it, devote themselves to the good of others, with­
out distinguishing between high and low, intimate or distant. Don’t 
trouble others or hurt their feelings over matters, either trivial or 
important.
In this passage, we see an exposition on both the compassion-wisdom per­
taining to a layman and to a monk. The emperor is praised for his compas­
sion-wisdom. Furthermore, he is held up as a moral exemplar for the monks. 
Yet note how Dogen proceeds: “How much more compassionate should the 
disciples of the Buddha, who follow in the style of the Tathagata, be!” And 
how does Dogen flesh out the kind of greater compassion-wisdom of the 
monk? As we can see, his description relies predominantly on the bodaisat­
ta shishdbo. Verbal kindness is evident in the admonition not to scold and 
hurt feelings. (Later in the passage, Dogen develops the point further, insist­
ing one should admonish with gentle words, not harsh ones.) Students should 
devote themselves to the good of others, without distinguishing between 
high and low, intimate or distant (i.e., through benevolence and identifica­
tion). Finally, the example of the emperor, who was content to live in a 
palace seriously in need of repair, introduces giving-noncovetousness into 
the discussion.
“How much better must the compassion-wisdom of the monk be,” is a 
sentiment Dogen expresses repeatedly in the text. We can see this all the 
more clearly when we acknowledge the mutual interdependence of compas­
sion-wisdom and the bodaisatta shishdbo. The reader may recall that when 
we began a discussion of the application of pratitya-samutpada to the four 
cardinal virtues of the bodhisattva, the first example cited was a passage 
from 3.3, wherein, within a short space, we could see reference to three of 
them in succession: identification, benevolence, and giving-noncovetous­
ness. Immediately before launching into a remark about identification, how­
ever, Dogen comments on what “true goodness” is for a layperson. He then 
proceeds to assert: “The truly good man does things for others, even if now 
or in the future they are in no way aware of it. How much better must the Zen 
monk be!”
Clearly, the Zen monk is to be better and more cultivated/expressive in 
compassion-wisdom in Dogen’s eyes. If we are to ask in what way this moral 
superiority arises and what it looks like, we can partly describe it by refer­
ence to the bodaisatta shishobo. We see an example of this in the Myoyu- 
Myozen story (5.12). Dogen recounts how the Zen master Myozen
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(1184-1225) was about to depart to China to seek the Dharma. His old 
teacher Myoyu Hli®, however, fell seriously ill, and requested Myozen to 
delay the trip in order to help him in his last days. Myozen calls his disciples 
together to ask their advice. After outlining the situation, acknowledging 
how much Myoyu has done for him, he comes directly to the point: “It is dif­
ficult to disobey a teacher’s request. But my going to China now at the risk 
of my life to seek the Way also derives from the great compassion of the bod­
hisattva and the desire to benefit all beings. Is there any justification for dis­
obeying my teacher’s wishes and going to China?”
Before proceeding, we should pause here to note how the foundational 
virtue of compassion-wisdom arises interdependently with that of the bod­
hisattva’s cardinal virtue of benevolence. Indeed, Myozen frames his in­
voking of compassion-wisdom in terms of “the great compassion of the 
bodhisattva.” As we shall see, this sets the tone for the remainder of the story 
and the subsequent discussion of it.
Dogen and the other disciples counsel him to honor the request and delay 
his trip. Myozen, however, views the situation differently. Ultimately, re­
maining behind to care for Myoyu would amount to little more service than 
comforting an old dying man, “but if I can carry out my determination to 
visit China in search of the Law and can gain even a trace of enlightenment, 
it will serve to awaken many people, even though it means opposing the 
deluded wishes of one man.” Declaring that it is wrong to waste precious 
time for the sake of benefiting a single man, he sets out for China.
Dogen expresses his approval of Myozen’s conduct. However, one disci­
ple is evidently not yet convinced:
Even if we cast aside obligation and affections towards parents and 
teachers when we consider the activities of a bodhisattva, should 
we not set aside benefits for ourselves and work for the benefit of 
others? Since there was no one else to nurse his teacher in the 
infirmities of his old age, wasn’t it contrary to the bodhisattva con­
duct for Myozen to think only of his own practice and not take care 
of his teacher when he was in a position to help him? A bodhisatt­
va must not discriminate in his good deeds. Do we base our under­
standing of Buddhism on what the circumstances or the occasion 
may be? Under this principle, should he not have stayed and 
helped him? Why should he not help his old and infirm teacher, 
instead of thinking only of his own desire to seek the Law? What 
is your opinion?
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Ejo, the author of the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki, was Dogen’s chief disciple. Ejo 
himself appears several times in the Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki, and 4.5 informs 
us that he was the first to fill the position of meditation director at Koshoji. 
This means that Ejo, in his official capacity, would have occasionally taught 
in place of Dogen, and indeed the section tells us that such was the case. So 
we have good reason to surmise that, at least in Dogen’s view, Ejo’s spiritu­
al attainment was considerable. We can also infer that Dogen’s response will 
be delivered at a comparably high level.
But first we must dissect Ejo’s response. The issue at hand, we recall, has 
to do with what Myozen should have done in the situation described. 
Myozen claims to be acting from the great compassion-wisdom of the bod­
hisattva. He reasons that seeking the Law supersedes his obligation to take 
care of his former teacher, and Dogen agrees. Ejo acknowledges that in seek­
ing the Law, one must renounce obligations to parents and teachers—on this 
point all three are in agreement.
But Ejo still wonders if Myozen did the right thing. His response essen­
tially poses the issue to Dogen in the same manner Myozen posed it to all his 
disciples: compassion-wisdom in terms of “the great compassion of the bod­
hisattva.” As with Myozen’s query, in Ejo’s first question the concern about 
compassion-wisdom arises concurrently with the issue of benefiting others. 
In effect, Ejo’s response reflects a point made earlier: the cultivation and 
expression of compassion-wisdom in the monk are especially interdependent 
with the bodaisatta shishobd.
This becomes all the more apparent in the second question, when Ejo asks 
whether it was not “contrary to bodhisattva conduct” for Myozen to think 
only of his own practice when he could help someone else. His reasoning? 
“A bodhisattva must not discriminate in his good deeds.” Ejo continues his 
line of argument with a rhetorical question which amounts to whether or not 
“due circumstances” should be taken into account in a moral dilemma such 
as this. To this, Dogen would undoubtedly answer yes—“good and evil arise 
according to circumstances,” as he notes in 5.14. All that remains, then, is for 
Ejo to bring his line of reasoning to a conclusion in terms of benevolence: 
shouldn’t Myozen stay and help his teacher rather than only thinking of his 
own desire to seek the Law?
Section 5.12 concludes with Dogen’s response to Ejo:
In both benefiting others and practicing yourself, to discard the 
inferior and adopt the superior comprise the good action of the
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bodhisattva. To offer a diet of beans and water in an effort to save 
the old and infirm merely caters to the misguided love and delud­
ed passions of this brief life. If you turn your back on the deluded 
emotions and study the Way that leads to enlightenment, even 
though you have cause for some regret, you will establish an excel­
lent base for transcending the world. Consider this well, consider 
this well!
Like Ejo (and Myozen earlier), Dogen invokes the compassion-wisdom of 
the bodhisattva concurrently with the virtue of benevolence. Furthermore, 
his reasoning also reflects the interdependency and mutual conditioning of 
the compassion-wisdom and the bodaisatta shishdbo. But Dogen arrives at a 
different conclusion from Ejo—partly, at least, because of a more thorough­
going application of these cardinal virtues to the situation.
We recall that Ejo pressed his point with the assertion that “a bodhisattva 
must not discriminate in his good deeds.” Notably, Dogen does not challenge 
this assertion about good deeds. However, before addressing the “good 
action of the bodhisattva,” he provides an important subordinate clause: “In 
both benefiting others and practicing yourself . . Whereas Ejo construes 
benevolence as benefiting others, Dogen construes it as applying not only to 
others but to ourselves as well. Thus Dogen draws our attention to the mutu­
al interpenetration of benevolence and identification. As he states in his 
exposition of identification, “after the self assimilates the other to itself, the 
self lets itself be assimilated to the other. The relationship of self and other is 
infinitely varied according to circumstances” (BS 4).
In employing a more thorough application of the interdependency of the 
bodaisatta shishdbd, therefore, Dogen demonstrates for Ejo a fuller under­
standing of the notion that “a bodhisattva must not discriminate in his good 
deeds”: he must be nondiscriminating not only in relations towards others, 
but he must be nondiscriminating between others and himself as well. The 
fact that identification is mutually interpenetrative with benevolence enables 
Dogen to say in the concluding paragraph on the latter virtue: “Therefore, we 
should try to benefit our enemies and friends or ourselves and others equal­
ly. Once we have this benevolent mind, it will arise unremittingly even for 
grass and trees and water. We must also try to save the foolish single-heart­
edly” (BS 4).
In this instance, Myoyu would seem to be one of the foolish in Dogen’s 
eyes. Offering a diet of beans and water to Myoyu not only does nothing for 
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Myozen’s practice, but does not amount to much on behalf of Myoyu in this 
brief life either—“it would not have anything to do with his escape from the 
cycle of birth and death,” as Myozen says earlier in the story. Furthermore, 
fulfilling the request would be catering to the misguided love and deluded 
passions of this life, which a monk is supposed to have renounced. At first 
glance, Dogen’s words seem to be applied to Myoyu, but the subsequent pas­
sage indicates that they refer more directly to Myozen. Granting Myoyu’s 
request would be “to curry another’s favor,” which is diametrically opposed 
to the virtue of giving-noncovetousness a monk is supposed to 
cultivate/express. Though one may experience some regret, if one can exer­
cise giving-noncovetousness and study the Way that leads to enlightenment, 
one “will establish an excellent basis for transcending the world.”
Ejo followed a line of reasoning based on the benevolence of the bodhi­
sattva in order to reach his conclusion. Dogen skillfully proceeds from the 
same starting point, but notes how “to discard the inferior and adopt the 
superior comprise the good action of the bodhisattva.” The monk, the bod- 
hisattva-in-training/unfolding, is called to a superior cultivation/expression 
of benevolence. As we saw above, in Dogen’s articulation of what benevo­
lence is, in these circumstances one can detect the interdependent arising of 
the virtues of identification and giving-noncovetousness. (That “verbal kind­
ness” would be how Myoyu should present his decision is an obvious infer­
ence.) Benevolence can be a virtue cultivated/expressed by a layperson, but 
the monk is called to a “higher” benevolence.
This call to a higher cultivation/expression of benevolence vis-a-vis a 
layperson is also displayed in 3.3. Dogen recounts how Emperor T’ai-tsung 
was informed that his subjects were criticizing him. He replied: “If I am 
benevolent and draw criticism, I need not worry. But if I am not benevolent 
and am praised, then I should worry.” Dogen, commenting on the emperor’s 
benevolence, remarks: “If even laymen have this attitude, how much more so 
should a monk.”
So far we have been analyzing the employment of the bodaisatta shishdbd, 
with some attention given to their relationship to compassion-wisdom. Yet 
these cardinal virtues also bear a relationship to other virtues expressed in the 
Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki. Consider the following passage:
When one thinks about it, everyone has his allotted share of food 
and clothing while he is alive. Laymen leave such matters to fate, 
while they concern themselves with loyalty and develop their filial
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piety. How much less then should monks be governed by worldly 
concerns!” (2.6)
This passage embedded in 2.6 is part of a long discourse pertaining to giv- 
ing-noncovetousness, and we see again how Dogen calls monks to a higher 
articulation of the virtue in comparison to laypersons. But more importantly 
for our purposes, introduced into the discussion are two virtues which, we 
are told, are concerns of laypersons: loyalty and filial piety.
This section compels us to ask: What is the relationship, if any, between 
the bodaisatta shishobo and other virtues like loyalty and filial piety? Also, 
how does the status of a monk vis-a-vis a layperson figure into consideration 
of this matter, if at all? While there are a number of virtues in the Shdbdgenzd 
Zuimonki snq could consider in seeking to work through these questions, per­
haps the best one to pursue is filial piety, which crops up several times in the 
text, both explicitly and implicitly. “Filial piety,” we recall, usually denotes 
the obligation children owe to their parents.
In section 2.19, Ejo asks: “Must we fulfill our obligations to our parents?” 
Dogen replies:
Filial piety is most important, but there is a difference between 
laymen and monks. Laymen, relying on such works as the Book of 
Filial Piety, take care of their parents during their lifetimes and 
hold services for them after their deaths. Monks, on the other hand, 
have severed their ties with the world and live in the religious 
realm. Thus their obligations are not limited to parents alone, but, 
feeling these obligations to all beings, they fill the world with good 
deeds. If they were merely to limit their obligations to their par­
ents, they would be turning against the religious way. True filial 
piety consists in following Buddhism in everyday practice and in 
each moment of study under a Zen Master. Offering services on 
the anniversary of a parent’s death and doing good for forty-nine 
days belong to the activities of the lay world. Zen monks must 
understand the deep obligations they bear their parents in the 
above terms. Does selecting just one day for doing good and hold­
ing services really reflect the spirit of Buddhism?
Dogen’s response indicates that the answer to Ejo’s question is different 
depending on whether the agent in question is a layperson or a monk. For the 
laity, the answer is clearly yes. Dogen takes the time to point out what a few 
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of these obligations are: taking care of parents during their lifetimes, holding 
services after their deaths, doing good for forty-nine days. To do this is to 
cultivate/express filial piety in the world.
But monks have severed their ties to the world. Are they, therefore, to 
exercise the virtue of filial piety? Yes, says Dogen—but they are to do so on 
terms appropriate to their station. How is this possible? Dogen’s reasoned 
response advances along lines parallel to the concluding exchange of the 
Myoyu-Myozen story. We recall Ejo’s point that “a bodhisattva must not 
discriminate in his good deeds.” This cultivation/expression of benevolence 
is an element here as well, inasmuch as a monk’s obligations “are not limit­
ed to parents alone, but, feeling these obligations to all beings, they fill the 
world with good deeds.” In terms of the bodaisatta shishobo, we can under­
stand this in the following manner: for the monk, the bodhisattva-in-training, 
the virtue of benevolence arises interdependently with the virtue of filial 
piety.
Dogen notes the lay practice of doing good in order to karmically benefit 
and assist a deceased parent. He subsequently poses a rhetorical question 
about this benevolence: “Does selecting just one day for doing good and 
holding services [for just one person] really reflect the spirit of 
Buddhism?”17 In the Myoyu-Myozen story, we saw how if Myozen helped 
his master at the expense of his efforts to help all sentient beings, this would 
reflect a failure in the cultivation/expression of giving-noncovetousness. We 
see much the same thing here, inasmuch as concentrating benevolence on 
just one person is to “curry their favor,” even if the person is dead—and after 
all, within forty-nine days the deceased is reborn into a new form, and can 
continue to have an effect on the benevolent person’s life in that existence. 
As in the Myoyu-Myozen story, in Dogen’s account of what one should do 
in this situation, we see giving-noncovetousness interdependently arising 
with and conditioning benevolence.
17 See Masunaga 1978, p. 115, n. 16.
In contrast to this lay practice of filial piety, Dogen asserts that “following 
Buddhism in everyday practice and in each moment of study under a Zen 
master” is the cultivation/expression of true filial piety. How is this possi­
ble? As in the resolution to the Myoyu-Myozen story, it seems that the 
answer can be articulated in terms of recognizing the interdependent arising 
of identification with benevolence. Recall that in the cultivation/expression 
of identification, we recognize that ultimately there is not only no distinction 
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between others, but between self and others as well. So the practice and study 
under a Zen master benefits not only oneself, but all others as well, inasmuch 
as ultimately all these others and the self are “not-two.” And as we recall, 
Dogen asserted that “in both benefiting others and practicing yourself, to 
discard the inferior and adopt the superior comprise the good action of the 
bodhisattva.” For the monk, the bodhisattva-in-training, to practice under a 
master is to adopt the superior form of filial piety; it meets obligations and 
confers benefits to parents greater than attending to material needs or per­
forming services. In Shdbdgenzd Zuimonki 3.14, another long passage 
addressing filial piety, Dogen remarks:
If you cast aside the filial love and duty you have not discarded 
over numerous kalpas and many lives, in this life when you have 
been bom in the body of a man and have had the rare opportunity 
to encounter Buddhism, this would be the mark of one who is truly 
grateful. How can this not accord with the Buddha’s will? It is said 
that if one son leaves his home to become a monk, seven genera­
tions of parents will gain the Way.
I noted above how, generally speaking, the compassion-wisdom of the monk 
can be articulated in terms of its interdependent arising with the cardinal 
virtues of the bodhisattva. To this point we can now add that the superior, 
“true filial piety” of the monk is also a virtue which we can explain as aris­
ing interdependently with the bodaisatta shishdbo. From the trajectory of 
this unfolding of Dogen’s virtue-thinking we are led to a hypothesis: For the 
monk, the foundational virtue of compassion-wisdom and the cardinal 
virtues of the bodhisattva can be said to arise interdependently with the 
cultivation/expression of any given virtue, reflecting Dogen’s radical appli­
cation ofpratitya-samutpada to all the virtues. Proving this hypothesis, how­
ever, requires evidence and argument additional to what has been offered in 
this article.
But let us not be led astray by all this talk of the cultivation/expression of 
the virtues in Dogen’s moral vision. Earlier in this article, I noted how for 
Dogen morality proceeds from zazera/enlightenment. The point of this article 
is that when we seek to describe this morality, we can refer not only to the 
precepts, but to virtues as well. From the above analysis, I hope it has been 
sufficiently demonstrated that the four cardinal virtues of the bodhisattva 
expounded upon in the Bodaisatta Shishdbo chapter of the Shdbdgenzd are a 
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useful starting point for articulating the virtue-thinking of Shdbdgenzd 
Zuimonki.
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